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Machine Learning for Optical Network Security
Monitoring: A Practical Perspective
Marija Furdek, Senior Member, IEEE, OSA, Carlos Natalino, Member, IEEE, Fabian Lipp, David Hock,
Andrea Di Giglio, and Marco Schiano, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In order to accomplish cost-efficient management of
complex optical communication networks, operators are seeking
automation of network diagnosis and management by means of
Machine Learning (ML). To support these objectives, new func-
tions are needed to enable cognitive, autonomous management
of optical network security. This paper focuses on the challenges
related to the performance of ML-based approaches for detection
and localization of optical-layer attacks, and to their integration
with standard Network Management Systems (NMSs).
We propose a framework for cognitive security diagnostics that
comprises an attack detection module with Supervised Learn-
ing (SL), Semi-Supervised Learning (SSL) and Unsupervised
Learning (UL) approaches, and an attack localization module
that deduces the location of a harmful connection and/or a
breached link. The influence of false positives and false neg-
atives is addressed by a newly proposed Window-based Attack
Detection (WAD) approach. We provide practical implementation
guidelines for the integration of the framework into the NMS and
evaluate its performance in an experimental network testbed
subjected to attacks, resulting with the largest optical-layer
security experimental dataset reported to date.
Index Terms—optical network security, monitoring, machine
learning, attack detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical networks, as the only viable technology for support-
ing the consistent network traffic growth, are critical commu-
nication infrastructure whose secure and reliable operation is
fundamental for a myriad of overlay services and applications.
The inherent vulnerabilities of optical network building blocks,
i.e., optical fibers, amplifiers and switches, can be exploited to
perform physical-layer attacks aimed at service disruption [2].
Such attacks can be performed by, e.g., gaining direct access
to patch-panels or the fiber plant largely deployed beyond a
secure perimeter.
Attack methods can be vastly different in their sophis-
tication, damaging potential, and the difficulty of detecting
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and counteracting them. For example, cutting the fiber is a
straightforward attack which affects all connections traversing
the cut link, and is relatively easy to detect as it causes loss of
signal at the receiver end. More sophisticated methods include
insertion of harmful, jamming signals (in-band or out-of-
band) upon tampering with the patch-panels or breaching the
fiber, e.g. by abusing a well-known monitoring technique for
creating temporary passive couplers by bending the fiber [3].
Damage from such attacks depends on the power and spectral
properties of the jamming signal as well as the underlying
optical network design. Optical layer can also be disrupted
without necessarily breaching the fiber, e.g. by a polarization
scrambling attack where the fiber is squeezed to cause fast-
varying polarization state variations that result in errors [4].
The complexity of the effects physical-layer attack techniques
have on optical channel parameters makes their detection a
very challenging task.
In order to sustain the evolution towards flexible, pro-
grammable and autonomous systems, optical networks should
support autonomous diagnostics and operation [5]. Integrated
telemetry and network analytics [6] are critical for realizing
the Observe-Analyze-Act control loop and improve network
performance, cost efficiency, and security [7]. The recent
proliferation of ML techniques into numerous aspects of op-
tical networking has brought forth new and powerful methods
for cognitive and automated management of optical network
security. These techniques have been shown successful in, e.g.,
detecting unauthorized signals in the network [8] or identifying
jamming and polarization scrambling attacks [4]. However,
the practicality of such solutions and their integration into
existing network management systems remains an open issue.
Challenges related to the performance of ML-based tools for
attack diagnostics include their accuracy and the granularity of
information they can provide; the complexity of their training
and inference; their scalability and robustness to changes in
the network states and the overall security threat landscape;
as well as the availability of representative and sufficient data.
Challenges related to their integration with standard network
management frameworks include the choice of extra software
that needs to be integrated into the control cycle; the soft-
ware architecture options available for their implementation;
and the implications of these architectures to the monitoring
system requirements in terms of capacity and communication
overhead.
The goal of this paper is to provide guidelines on the imple-
mentation of ML-based framework for optical-layer security
monitoring. The paper combines new research findings related
2to the design, deployment and performance of the attack de-
tection framework with practical insights gained from the first
demonstration of ML-based physical-layer security monitoring
in an optical network scenario in [1]. The contributions of this
paper extend the work from [1] in several ways, summarized
as follows:
• SSL algorithms, in addition to SL and UL approaches
for detection of physical-layer attacks are evaluated on
the largest experimental dataset reported to date,
• A novel Window-based Attack Detection (WAD) ap-
proach is proposed, based on an analytical method for
assessing the impact of false positives and/or false nega-
tives on the probability of raising a security alarm for a
given observation window,
• An approach for formulating binary attack syndromes to
localize the source of link-based, as well as connection-
based attacks in the network is presented,
• An assessment of architectural decisions in terms of
software and ML models is performed,
• An encompassing comparative performance analysis of
the three ML techniques is carried out, and the impact
of their performance on the overall attack detection is
evaluated.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Autonomous optical network management
To cope with increasing network heterogeneity and dy-
namicity, operators are striving towards cognition-driven au-
tomation of network planning and management workflows,
abandoning the unreliable, ineffective and unscalable use of
pre-determined thresholds on network performance indicators
as triggers for (re)configuration actions, and embedding intel-
ligent analytic techniques to analyse root cause of faults [6].
A generic transport Software Defined Networking (SDN)-
integrated architecture for cognitive assurance is described
in [6], embedding an analytics integration engine for fault
detection into a state-of-the-art SDN framework. The authors
present different options of running the engine, i.e., as a
third party application, transport application, or integrated with
the orchestrator, the transport SDN, or the hypervisor, and
describe performance and interoperability trade-offs incurred
by these alternatives. Protocols and models enabling advanced
real-time SDN telemetry services in optical networks are
described in [9], along with an experimental demonstration
of an on-demand streaming telemetry service that can run
either embedded into the SDN control plane using NETCONF
protocol over a dedicated connection, or independently using a
different API, such as gRPC with better support for telemetry
data streaming.
Autonomous network operation relies on closing the loop
between collecting the telemetry data, analyzing this data by
applying different examination and interpretation functions,
and performing actions necessary to maintain high network
performance. This loop is referred to as the Observe-Decide-
Act loop in [10], Observe-Analyze-Act loop in [7], and
Collect-Analyze-Test (CAT) loop in [5]. The work in [10]
focuses on increasing the efficiency of network resource usage
by estimating Quality of Transmission (QoT) and applying
ML techniques for margin reduction, along with experimen-
tally demonstrating dynamic connection provisioning and rate
adaptation under fiber/amplifier and Reconfigurable Optical
Add-Drop Multiplexer (ROADM) aging, as well as frequency
correction. In [7], the authors investigate similar use cases
and discuss key requirements, advantages and drawbacks of
centralized, distributed and hierarchical monitoring and data
analytics capabilities, indicating main issues to be addressed
before the potential of these tools can be fully utilized. In [5],
key requirements on network diagnosis are examined from an
operator’s perspective on use cases related to 5G, optical trans-
port disaggregation and multioperator orchestration, detailing
on the role of the CAT loop as an enabler of truly autonomous,
programmable networks.
All of the above approaches rely on the widespread and
effective deployment of a plethora of ML techniques. In [11],
the authors elaborate on key factors that drive the proliferation
of ML in optical network management, overview typical ML
algorithms and their application to optical networking prob-
lems, and list major challenges in the techniques’ widespread
deployment. ML-enabling data management issues are shown
to encompass the discrepancies in network data sources (e.g.,
event logs, sensors, probes, signalling), monitoring device
heterogeneity (in terms of, e.g., interfaces and protocols), data
storage and representation.
The potential of ML tools to support complex tasks of
autonomous network management has been shown in numer-
ous application scenarios. A comprehensive survey of artifi-
cial intelligence techniques applicable to optical networking,
which include ML as their subset, can be found in [12].
ML techniques applied to optical communications, as outlined
in [13], typically attempt to perform regression, i.e., provide
a functional description of given data in an effort to predict
future values, or classification, i.e., derive decision boundaries
between different data classes.
In doing so, Supervised Learning (SL) learning techniques
(e.g., Artificial Neural Network (ANN) or Support Vector
Machine (SVM)) utilize the a priori knowledge of class labels
during training. The data can be labeled through carefully
designed experiments by the experimenters or through au-
tomatized labeling. Labels can also be obtained from the
network management system based on previous occurrences of
events of interest. SL models are appropriate when complete
information regarding what should be learned is available, i.e.,
the dataset defines exactly the inputs given to and the outputs
expected from the model. During training, the parameters of
the model are adjusted to match the observed outputs to the
expected ones as close as possible.
In Unsupervised Learning (UL) (e.g., K-means clustering or
principal components analysis), such labels are not available,
but the algorithm learns to identify similarities between dif-
ferent inputs to cluster the data or extract features. UL models
are appropriate when the dataset has no clear input/output
nor strictly defined normal/abnormal conditions, but should
be grouped by similarity, conversely substantially separating
diverging points based on the intuition that anomalous samples
are much rarer than the normal ones. UL usually has no
3training phase, and the entire dataset needs to be traversed
whenever new data points are included.
Semi-Supervised Learning (SSL) techniques (e.g., one-class
support vector machine) combine the two approaches above,
and are applicable in cases when labelling the majority of the
data is too costly or infeasible, so only a small subset of the
data is labeled [14]. For instance, when applied to anomaly
detection, the training dataset should contain the normal data,
and the algorithm should detect new data that is significantly
different from that in the training dataset. During training, the
parameters of the model are adjusted to enclose the normal
samples with a spatial region as tightly as possible, facilitating
the detection of data that falls outside the region as anomalous.
Approaches from the above categories have been applied to
various optical networking tasks, such as performance predic-
tion and fault diagnosis. Optical path performance prediction
is typically addressed with different SL models, as in [15],
where the contribution of different features to the regression
error is analysed, [16], where a detailed comparison to existing
theoretical models is performed, and [17], where the impact
of the new lightpath to existing network connections is also
taken into account.
Cognitive detection of so-called soft failures that result
in gradual performance degradation of lightpaths is also of-
ten addressed with SL techniques. Component power and
temperature are used to predict transceiver board failures
in [18]. Detection and identification of failures caused by
filter misalignment and undesired amplifier gain reduction is
performed in [19] by analysing the Bit Error Rate (BER).
Localization of filter shift and tightening is investigated in
[20] by applying multi-classifier, single-classifier and residual
computation approaches on the signal spectrum. In [21], the
authors combine UL with SL for single-point and end-to-
end detection of anomalies generated by excessive, varying
signal attenuation. The data is not labeled beforehand, but
UL performs density-based clustering to analyze patterns in
the monitored data which are then further analyzed with an
SL module. An encompassing tutorial on ML for failure
management is presented in [22].
B. Optical network security management
Security is an essential aspect of truly autonomous network
operation capable of diagnosing and counteracting breaches.
Management of optical network security relies on three pillars:
prevention, detection and reaction to attacks. Prevention of
attacks encompasses risk modeling, vulnerability assessment
and minimization of the attack surface through attack-aware
network design and operation. Overviews of physical-layer
vulnerabilities in evolving optical networks and attack tech-
niques that exploit them to disrupt services can be found in [2],
[23]. Awareness of physical-layer security was first introduced
to optical network design, i.e. connection routing, in [24].
Approaches for attack-aware routing and spectrum allocation
have been developed for static [25], periodic [26] and dynamic
traffic [27].
Detection of attacks, which is in the focus of this paper,
entails continuous monitoring of optical channels’ perfor-
mance, correctly attributing the observed degradation to a
security breach, and determining the source location. Some
attack techniques, such as high-power jamming, or tapping,
can be detected by tracking the associated power surges or
power drops, respectively. An approach for detecting intrusion-
triggered power losses in passive optical network was proposed
in [28]. Algorithms in [29], [30] localize the source of high-
power jamming attacks by detecting power surges and com-
paring the power levels at the input and the output side of each
node to detect the most upstream node where this relationship
is abnormal. Many Optical Performance Monitoring (OPM)
techniques, whose overview can be found in [31], require spe-
cialized devices such as Optical Spectrum Analyzers (OSAs).
An OSA-based approach for detecting intrusion signals can be
found in [8]. However, due to their prohibitive cost, OSAs are
typically deployed only at a limited number of network sites.
The advances in Digital Signal Processing (DSP)-enabled
coherent transceivers allow the NMS to obtain a rich OPM
dataset which, combined with data analytic tools, can be used
for security diagnostic purposes without the need for costly
monitoring devices. Determining the location of attacks which
do not necessarily cause changes in the power levels was
addressed in [32] by modeling the scope of harmful connec-
tions with binary words called Attack Syndromes (AttSyns).
When AttSyns are unique for all attack scenarios, the harmful
connection that caused the attack can be deduced from the
subset of affected connections. Otherwise, additional security
monitors or monitoring probes, whose resource-minimizing
design was proposed in [33], are necessary to provide AttSyn
disambiguation.
Mitigation of attacks encompasses fast and efficient re-
covery of the affected services as well as network adapta-
tion to reduce the vulnerability to future attack occurrences.
Protection from eavesdropping and jamming attacks via fast
frequency hopping over fewest-shared-link multi-paths was
proposed in [34]. Planning of protection resources capable
of guaranteeing protection from jamming attacks based on
identifying overlaps in attack scopes of the working and the
backup path of each connection was presented in [35]. In [36],
the authors experimentally demonstrated mitigation of attacks
in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-enabled optical networks
under physical-layer attacks aimed at key-rate degradation.
ML-based Attack Detection and Identification (ADI) func-
tions are new features in the family of network analytics.
While existing works consider connection degradation caused
by component faults, management of physical-layer security
threats remains an open issue. ML was applied to optical net-
work security in [8], where the optical spectrum is scrutinized
with SVM to identify malicious light sources traversing unau-
thorized paths. In [37], ANN was applied to detect high-power
jamming and identify promising attack mitigation strategies.
In [4], we applied various supervised learning approaches
for detecting in-band, out-of-band jamming and polarization
scrambling attacks on an optical link by analysing the ex-
perimental OPM data collected from a coherent receiver. In
[38], techniques based on unsupervised learning were devised
to detect attacks previously unseen and untrained for. First
efforts towards integrating attack detection and localization
into optical network management were demonstrated in [1].
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Fig. 1. Steps taken by SL, SSL and UL to accommodate for a new connection
request or a newly discovered physical-layer attack type. Continuous lines
represent the traditional process of establishing, operating and maintaining a
connection. Dashed lines represent the steps inherent to the ML techniques.
In this paper, we extend upon the work in [1] by developing
an encompassing ML-based framework for optical network se-
curity diagnostics, evaluating its performance on experimental
data from an operator testbed, and providing guidelines on
incorporating it into the NMS.
III. NETWORK-WIDE ATTACK DETECTION AND
IDENTIFICATION APPROACHES
Detection and identification of attacks can be performed
by different ML techniques. Previous works have investigated
the use of SL [4] and UL [38] from a single-link and
single Optical Channel (OCh) perspective. However, adopting
a network-wide multi-OCh Attack Detection and Identifica-
tion (ADI) solution presents challenges and brings concerns
beyond accuracy. Therefore, the benefits and drawbacks of
each ML technique need to be assessed considering not only
the accuracy of the models, but also their implications to the
network operation.
The main differences between supervised, semi-supervised
and unsupervised learning techniques are in their dataset
requirements and training processes. Understanding how these
models can be integrated into the NMS is of fundamental
importance for efficient and reliable security assessment. Fig.
1 illustrates the steps inherent to SL, SSL and UL to accom-
modate for a new connection request or a newly discovered
physical-layer attack type. A standard NMS action upon arrival
of a new connection request is to set up a new optical channel,
which may involve several channel estimation and resource
assignment decisions. Once the channel is set up, a channel
validation step verifies if the physical-layer conditions are
appropriate, and, if yes, collects a set of OPM samples that are
regarded as Normal Operating Conditions (NOC), i.e., repre-
sent the baseline OCh performance in attack-free conditions.
The NOC samples are used for training in SSL and as baseline
for SL. If SL is used, a representative dataset with channel
performance in the presence of all known attack techniques
must also be collected and labeled for ADI training purposes.
This can incur complexities in designing and performing the
experiments and may delay the operational phase of the OCh.
For SSL, the attack-specific dataset collection step is bypassed
and the model is retrained using only the NOC samples. UL
skips both steps and proceeds with operation as before the
newly arrived connection or attack type.
The main properties of ML techniques investigated in this
paper are summarized Table I and highlighted as positive,
negative and critical. All techniques require acquisition of
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF SUPERVISED
LEARNING (SL), SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING (SSL) AND
UNSUPERVISED LEARNING (UL) FOR ADI.
Property SL SSL UL
Requires NOC data Yes Yes Yes
Attack detection Yes Yes Yes
Attack identification Yes No No
Requires attack-specific labeled data Yes No No
Training complexity High Low None
Re-training for new OChs Yes Yes No
Inference complexity Low Low High
Requires prior samples No No Yes
Supports stateless operation Yes Yes Yes
NOC: Normal Operating Conditions; OCh: Optical Channel; green:
positive; yellow: negative; red: critical.
NOC data and perform attack detection, i.e., classify OCh
condition between normal and under-attack. Due to the la-
beling of attack samples, only SL models are able to perform
attack identification, i.e., classify the specific attack technique
(and its intensity) disrupting the OCh. The attack identification
capability reflects on the need for a training dataset containing
samples from all attack conditions, i.e., attack-specific data,
resulting in a high training complexity observed for SL.
Meanwhile, only NOC samples are required for training SSL
models, resulting in a low training complexity. Both SL and
SSL require re-training when new connections are established,
given that they may traverse different network components
than any existing channel. In this regard, UL does not require
any (re-)training.
Inference complexity follows an opposite trend from the
training complexity. SL and SSL perform inference efficiently
due to the fact that they have parameters that store the learned
properties extracted from the dataset during training. On the
other hand, UL needs to traverse the entire dataset every time
a new prediction is made, which affects its efficiency and
scalability. In the UL case, this dataset is usually composed
of a number of prior samples that are used to characterize the
NOC. Finally, due to not requiring prior samples, SL and SSL
models have better support for stateless operation (which is
discussed in more detail in Sec. V).
In order to evaluate performance of an ADI model, sev-
eral metrics should be acquired. A fundamental performance
indicator refers to the correctness in identifying the analyzed
OPM samples. The samples obtained during an attack that
are correctly classified as attacks are referred to as true
positives, while their opposite, those not classified as attacks
are false negatives. The NOC samples, i.e., those obtained in
the absence of attack that are correctly classified as attack-
free are true negatives, while their opposite, those wrongly
classified as attacks are false positives. The true positive rate
is denoted by TP , the false negative by FN , the true negative
by TN , and the false positive rate by FP .
In this paper, we use the f1 score to evaluate the accuracy
of the ML models. The best ML model, or a particular model
configuration, can be selected according to the highest f1
score. The f1 score is defined in (1) a function of the precision
(P ) and recall (R). Precision (P ) is defined in (2) and mea-
sures the sensitivity of an ML model to false positives. Recall
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Fig. 2. Possible occurrences of false positive and false negative samples in
an observation window δ.
(R) measures the sensitivity of a model to false negatives,
as defined in (3). The f1 score balances the importance of
precision and recall into a single metric, which is equal to 1
when the model is perfectly accurate in detecting attacks, and
smaller otherwise.
f1 = 2× P ×R
P +R
(1)
P =
TP
TP + FP
(2)
R =
TP
TP + FN
(3)
A. Window-based Attack Detection (WAD)
To address the issue of false positive and false negative
rates of the ML algorithms and reduce the impact of possible
fast oscillations in the detected security status, we propose a
Window-based Attack Detection (WAD) approach for security
diagnostics. Instead of directly raising security alarms based on
the ML output, WAD applies an additional inquiry mechanism
by defining an observation window and setting a threshold
on the number of samples in which attack presence must
be detected before an alarm is triggered. In order to set the
observation period and the alarm threshold in a way which
ensures high attack detection accuracy, it is important to gauge
the impact of false positive and negative rates on the overall
security diagnostic performance.
To analyse the impact of false positive and false negative
rates, let us use a simple example shown in Fig. 2. Let δ denote
the total number of samples considered for security monitor-
ing, while γ (γ ≤ δ) is the number of samples collected after
the attack occurrence. Before the attack, the security status
of the analyzed connection can either be reported correctly
as attack-free (true negative) or incorrectly as affected by an
attack (false positive). After the attack, the status can either
be reported correctly as affected by an attack (true positive),
or incorrectly as attack-free (false negative), as depicted in
Fig. 2. Note that TN + FP = 1 holds over the δ − γ samples
and TP + FN = 1 holds over the γ samples.
If the attack detection module requires a threshold of τ
positives out of the observed δ samples in order to raise
an alarm, the probability of detecting an attack upon its
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Benefits obtained by the window-based approach for different true
negative (TN ) and true positive (TP ) rates: (a) increase in true and (b)
decrease in false attack detection (δ=100, γ=10 and τ=3).
occurrence can be expressed as follows:
τ∑
l=0
(
δ − γ
l
)
F lPT
δ−γ−l
N ·
γ∑
k=τ−l
(
γ
k
)
T kPF
γ−k
N +
δ−γ∑
l=τ+1
(
δ − γ
l
)
F lPT
δ−γ−l
N ·
γ∑
k=0
(
γ
k
)
T kPF
γ−k
N .
(4)
The first product in (4) refers to the case when there are 0 to
τ false positives prior to the attack and 0 to γ true positives
upon the attack, such that there are τ or more positive (true
or false) samples in total. The second product in (4) refers to
the case when there are τ or more false positives prior to the
attack and 0 to γ true positives upon the attack. In case there
is no attack (γ = 0), an alarm can only be attributed to the
false positives, and the probability of raising it is given by:
δ∑
l=τ
(
δ
l
)
F lPT
δ−l
N (5)
Based on (4) and (5), Figs. 3a and b show the general
benefits of the proposed window-based approach in terms of
an increase in true detection and a decrease in false detection
compared to directly raising alarms, respectively, as a function
of the TN and TP values for fixed δ, γ and τ . A detailed
analysis of the impact of δ, γ, and τ on the probability of a
security alarm being raised by the WAD approach combined
with the developed UL and SSL models based on their TN
and TP performance is presented in Section VII.
IV. ATTACK SOURCE LOCALIZATION
For an encompassing physical-layer security monitoring
framework, it is necessary not only to accurately detect when
connections are affected by a physical-layer attack, but also
to determine the location of the breach as a prerequisite of its
neutralization. To this end, we define a framework for network-
wide attack source localization based on identifying the scopes
of different attack techniques and evaluating their effects for
different physical locations of potential breaches.
The scope of an attack is modelled by binary words which
we refer to as Attack Syndromes (AttSyns) [32]. The length
of AttSyns matches the number of connections in the network
and each bit denotes the security status of the corresponding
connection recorded at the destination, where the regular,
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Fig. 5. Communication diagram among the modules for optical network security monitoring.
attack-free status is denoted by 0 while an affected status is de-
noted by 1. Attack syndromes are formed for each connection
during setup by identifying the effects of the considered attack
technique and determining whether the connection is affected
for different potential locations of the attack. The AttSyns
formed for different locations of a particular attack technique
are stored and looked up for comparison with temporally
evolving security statuses of connections.
If the attack syndromes for each attack scenario are unique,
the source of an attack can be determined without additional
diagnostic effort. If they are not unique, additional monitor-
ing insights are needed. These can be obtained by adding
monitoring probes or strategically placing OPM devices at
intermediate nodes in the network. To avoid the extra cost
of OPM devices, we rely on establishing monitoring probes
to resolve ambiguities in AttSyns [32].
The AttSyn-based approach for attack source localization
is illustrated on a simple example shown in Fig. 4a. Initially,
only connections C1 and C2 are present in the network. If we
consider an attack scenario where user connections registered
in the system (i.e., C1 or C2 in the example) can become the
source of an attack (e.g., by tampering with their power levels)
and affect any other connections they share links with, the
AttSyns are formed for each connection as the attack source,
as shown in Fig.4b [32], [33]. In the AttSyn table, the rows
match the attack source, while the columns correspond to
the resulting degradation of each connection. If polarization
scrambling (Pol) and out-of-band jamming (OBJ) attacks are
considered, the model has to be adapted to the properties
of these attacks. These attacks degrade all connections that
traverse the breached link, so AttSyns need to be formed for
each link as a possible source location, as shown in Fig. 4c.
As can be seen from the two AttSyn tables in Fig. 4, there
is a substantial overlap of syndromes generated for the case
when only C1 and C2 are established in the network. Adding
P1 as a monitoring probe resolves this ambiguity in the table
in Fig. 4b. The table in Fig. 4c contains two pairs of matching
syndromes, denoted with red dashed frames. To resolve the
overlap, one discerning bit must be added to each syndrome in
a matching pair, which is achieved by establishing monitoring
probes P1 and P2.
The AttSyn tables can be defined and disambiguated for
one specific attack methodology (e.g., with link-wise or
connection-wise effects only) or over a larger set of attack
techniques (e.g., with link- and connection-wise effects com-
bined). The former is applicable when the attack localization
module receives fine-granular attack identification information
and can utilize the information on attack method to narrow
down the search to the matching AttSyn table. The latter is
needed when the attack identification module reports only
the degradation of connections, without providing insight
into the type of attack. In this case, the syndromes must
be disambiguated across the entire AttSyn table, as is the
case in the example shown in Fig. 4. Note that the AttSyn-
7based intrusion localization does not apply to in-band jamming
attacks, where the damaging effects remain confined to the
affected connection, which requires monitoring at intermediate
nodes.
V. ML-AIDED OPTICAL SECURITY MONITORING
Fig. 5 illustrates the modules of the security diagnostic
framework developed in this work, as well as their commu-
nication during one monitoring cycle. The Monitoring and
Visualization Server (MVS) is the central monitoring agent,
which is usually a standalone software specifically developed
for network and service management, e.g., StableNet [39].
It is responsible for polling the optical transceivers using
an appropriate protocol, e.g., NETCONF, and storing the
reported OPM parameters in a long-term data storage for
further processing. Once OPM data for the current cycle has
been collected for all the active connections in the network, the
MVS invokes the Machine-Learning-based Attack Detection
and Identification Module (ML-ADIM), which uses one of the
ML models explored in Sec. III to assess the security status
of each connection. If the Window-based Attack Detection
approach from Sec. III-A is adopted, the ML-ADIM will, in
addition to the current OPM data, also require the previous
δ − 1 samples forming the observation window. WAD can
be implemented as a separate module too, but for the sake
of simplicity in the architecture and message exchange, we
decided to integrate it into the ML-ADIM. Provided with
the security statuses of all connections, the MVS invokes
the Attack Localization Module (ALM), which deploys the
appropriate techniques described in Sec. IV to determine the
harmful connection or the compromised link. The reply from
ALM is used by MVS to update its Graphical User Interface
(GUI) and dispatch the outcome of the security diagnostic
procedure to the network manager. One option to realize
the communication between the MVS, ML-ADIM and ALM
is to use Representational State Transfer (REST) services
with persistent connections exchanging data using compressed
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) encoding, which results in
an efficient use of network resources.
An important design decision for the modules in Fig. 5
is the network state management. If the micro-service and
stateless principles of web-service design are followed, the
modules for attack detection and localization should be as
simple as possible. As a result, the MVS should include all
inputs required by each module every time they are called. For
the ML-ADIM, if UL is selected as the model of choice, prior
samples (discussed in Table I) should be included. For the
ALM, the pre-computed AttSyns should be included. While
this option reduces the complexity of the modules, bringing
significant benefits in terms of simpler deployment, easier
migration and scaling according to the network load, it comes
at the cost of increased traffic between the MVS and the other
modules. Finally, since these modules will receive all the input
they need from the MVS, the same instance of the service can
serve multiple domains owned by the same entity.
If ML-ADIM and ALM are deployed as stateful services,
each of these modules should contain the means to store
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TABLE II
OPTICAL PERFORMANCE MONITORING (OPM) PARAMETERS OF EACH
DATA SAMPLE
Acronym Description
CD Chromatic Dispersion
DGD Differential Group Delay
OSNR Optical Signal to Noise Ratio
PDL Polarization Dependent Loss
Q-factor Q factor
BE-FEC Block Errors before FEC
BER-FEC Bit Error Rate before FEC
UBE-FEC Uncorrected Block
BER-POST-FEC Bit Error Rate after FEC
OPR Optical Power Received
OPT Optical Power Transmitted
OFT Optical Frequency Transmitted
OFR Optical Frequency Received
LOS Loss Of Signal
For all parameters except BE-FEC, UBE-FEC, and LOS, the system
provides the maximum, minimum and average values in the observation
interval.
the long-term information necessary for their execution. The
ML-ADIM should store the prior samples (if necessary), and
the ALM should store the topological, routing and AttSyn
information. Both of these modifications would reduce the
size of the messages exchanged with the MVS. However,
the state management of stateful services makes them more
resource-demanding (in terms of processing and storage), and
more challenging to adapt to changing network conditions
(i.e., to migrate, scale, or recover from faults). Due to the
stateful property, these models are not appropriate for security
assessment in multi-domain scenarios.
VI. OPTICAL JAMMING EXPERIMENTS IN A NETWORK
TESTBED
The proposed ML-based framework for cognitive security
assessment has been assessed in an experimental optical net-
work testbed environment. The testbed, shown in Fig. 6, is
based upon commercial optical transport network technology
and is composed by 6 ROADM nodes, 1 EDFA amplification
node and 10 links. The ROADMs are fixed-grid multidegree
nodes capable of carrying 80 optical channels at 50 GHz
spacing. The links are composed of 25 dB optical attenuators
to emulate fibre loss. We have inserted a 3 dB fibre coupler
(emulating a bent-fibre temporary coupler that might be used
for a field attack) and a polarization modulator in the amplified
link to enable the injection of a jamming signal and the
high speed polarization modulation attack as described later.
8(a) Unperturbed signal (b) In-band attack scheme (c) Out-of-band attack scheme
Fig. 7. (a) Power spectrum of the unperturbed DWDM signal at the EDFA node monitoring port. The OSA resolution is 0.5 nm. (b) Power spectrum of
the 195.2 THz OCh under test in the in-band attack scheme (-7 dB intrusion signal power with respect to the OCh under attack). The 195.3 THz OCh is
unaffected by this attack. (c) Power spectrum of all channels in the out-of-band attack scheme (+8.7 dB intrusion signal power with respect to the OCh under
test). The intrusion signal is the one just at the right-hand side of the OCh under test.
The polarization modulator is an all-fiber component made
by 3 piezoelectric fiber squeezers that produce stress-induced
birefringence and hence polarization modulation. Just one
of the fiber squeezers is used. It is driven by a sinewave
signal at 136 kHz frequency, which corresponds to one of the
resonant frequencies of the piezoelectric element and therefore
produces a deep polarization modulation even with modest
driving voltage. The polarization modulator loss is negligible,
and it does not perturb the DWDM signal except when the
sinewave generator is switched on to simulate a polarization
attack. A Continuous Wave (CW) tunable laser is connected
to the 3 dB coupler as a jamming signal generator.
The OChs under test are two 200 Gbit/s polarization
multiplexed 16QAM signals generated by two commercial
transponders (Infinera Groove G30). The two OChs, whose
frequencies are 195.2 and 195.3 THz (1535.82 and 1535.04 nm
wavelength respectively), are handled by the network as alien
lambdas and are routed on two paths that share the amplified
link where the attacks are implemented. The network is loaded
with 4 additional coherent OChs spanning from 1537 nm to
1556 nm wavelength.
An OSA is connected to the monitor port of the EDFA node
to measure the power spectra of the DWDM signal just after
the injection of the jamming signal. The power spectrum of the
unperturbed DWDM signal at the EDFA node monitoring port
is shown in Fig. 7a. In normal working condition, i.e. without
any intrusion signal or polarization modulation, the two OChs
under test operate error-free with 32 dB Optical Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (OSNR)0.1 (measured with 0.5 nm resolution and
rescaled to 0.1 nm).
The network management system of the commercial optical
network has been used just once at the beginning of the
experiment for alien lambdas provisioning. Later, we have
relied just on the NETCONF/YANG management system of
the two Infinera transponders. OPM data provided by the
coherent receivers, shown in Table II, are downloaded every
minute by an application based on the NETCONF protocol.
The first set of 1440 OPM data records (1 record per minute
during a 24 hour time period) was collected in the normal
operating condition and labelled as the baseline (BSL) of our
experiment. After full characterization of the system baseline,
we have applied the following attack techniques.
1) In-band jamming attack: the intrusion signal is a CW low
power signal whose frequency falls within the bandwidth
of the signal under test.
2) Out-of-band jamming attack: the intrusion signal is a
CW signal with a frequency outside the bandwidth of
the signal under test.
3) Polarization modulation attack: the polarization modu-
lator is activated and causes transmission errors as soon
as the induced polarization variation is faster than the
coherent receiver’s polarization recovery algorithm (the
intrusion signal is switched off).
A. In-Band Jamming Attack
The power spectrum of the OCh under test for the in-band
attack is shown in Fig. 7b. The reader can notice that the
jamming signal (the small peak on the right-hand side of
the OCh spectrum) is slightly detuned with respect to the
central frequency of the OCh under test as doing so makes
the jamming particularly effective (i.e. a remarkable increase
in BER-POST-FEC can be achieved by modest intrusion signal
power).
We have implemented two in-band attack conditions, light
(INBLGT) and strong (INBSTR), by setting the power of
the intrusion signal to 10 and 7 dB below the power of the
signal under test, respectively. In these conditions, the system
produces Uncorrected Block Errors (UBE-FEC) ranging from
a few blocks per minute to many thousands blocks per
minute which we classify as light and strong attack conditions
respectively. A full OPM data set with 1440 records has been
logged for each of these two attack conditions.
B. Out-of-Band Jamming Attack
Fig. 7c shows the full DWDM power spectrum of the out-
of-band attack. The intrusion signal frequency was 195.1 THz
(1536.61 nm). In this type of attack, the intrusion signal is not
included in the OCh plan of the network management system.
When it is injected in the link, it represents an unforeseen input
signal for the following optical amplifier and it creates a power
reduction on the other operating OChs when the amplifier is
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Fig. 8. A subset of OPM data collected during the considered security
regimes: OSNR, OPR (both normalized) and BER-FEC.
configured in the constant power mode. This in turn produces
a reduction of the OSNR that impairs all the working channels
or degrades their performance. This feature distinguishes the
out-of-band attack from the in-band one: all OChs passing
through the link under attack are affected in the former, while
just one OCh is harmed in the latter. On the other hand, in the
out-of-band attack the power required for the intrusion signal
is much higher than in the in-band attack: we have set the
power of the intrusion signal to +3 and +8.7 dB with respect
to the power of the OCh under test to get light (OOBLGT)
and strong (OOBSTR) attack conditions respectively. A full
OPM data set with 1440 records has been logged for each
condition.
C. Polarization Modulation Attack
In the polarization attack, we have switched off the intrusion
signal and activated the polarization state modulator. In this
operating condition, all the optical parameters of the system
are the same as the baseline condition, but the polarization
modulation causes transmission errors when the coherent
receiver’s polarization recovery algorithm is unable to track
the fast polarization changes [40]. Similarly to the out-of-band
attack, the polarization attack affects all the coherent OChs
traversing the link where polarization modulation is applied.
We have experimentally identified one of the resonant
frequencies of the fiber squeezer at 136 kHz by monitoring the
amplitude of the sinewave driving signal. Then, the sinewave
amplitude was set to 0.4 and 1.6 V peak-to-peak resulting in
light (POLLGT) and strong (POLSTR) attack, respectively. A
full OPM data set with 1440 records has been logged for each
condition.
Fig. 8 provides an insight into general trends observed
for representative OPM parameters, i.e., OSNR, OPR and
BER-FEC collected during the considered security regimes. As
can be seen in the figure, OSNR and OPR (whose values are
normalized) show very little time variations over the different
scenarios. BER-FEC shows a remarkable increase with respect
to the baseline in in-band jamming attacks but remains almost
unchanged in out-of-band jamming attacks, while it exhibits
a noisy up-and-down behaviour in polarization modulation
attacks. This weird behaviour prohibits the use of a threshold
based approach for security diagnostics and makes identifying
the root cause of the detected anomaly extremely difficult even
for an optical system expert.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The performance of the ML techniques described in Sec.
III was evaluated using the dataset described in Sec. VI.
In particular, ANN was chosen for SL, One-Class Support
Vector Machine (OCSVM) for SSL and Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) for UL,
due to their state-of-the-art performance in many tasks [41].
The evaluation was performed using Python and the Scikit-
learn implementation. The dataset contains 1440 samples
from each connection under each attack condition, yielding
a total of 20,160 samples. This is 7 times larger than in [8]
and makes the largest experimental dataset related to optical
network security reported to date. The collected samples were
pre-processed by removing samples with missing data and
applying z-score standardization.
For the ANN, several architectures were evaluated using k-
fold cross validation technique, with the best one having 3
layers with [50, 100, 50] neurons. This architecture was then
trained using a 50%, 25%, 25% training, validation and test
sets for 1,000 epochs with Adam optimizer minimizing its
categorical cross-entropy loss. For the OCSVM, three param-
eters were evaluated: kernel, which defines the kernel function
adopted; ν, which defines an upper bound on the training
errors; and g, which (when applicable) defines the coefficient
of the kernel function. For the DBSCAN, two parameters were
evaluated: MinPts, which defines the minimum number of
samples within an area required to form a cluster; and ,
which defines the radius of the area of search. Both OCSVM
and DBSCAN were evaluated using samples selected from
the dataset with 10:1.5 normal-to-attack sampling ratio. To
improve the reliability of the false positive and false negative
rates reported for SSL and UL, attack detection was performed
for 50 randomly sampled batches of NOC samples. For each
of these NOC batches, we further sample 50 batches from
each attack condition.
Fig. 9 presents the test results for the three evaluated models.
Fig. 9a shows the confusion matrix of the test dataset after
training the ANN. This matrix assesses the per-class accuracy
of the ANN by showing the portion of samples from one class
being correctly or wrongly predicted as another. The very high
accuracy observed, with no false positives nor false negatives,
translates into the maximum f1 score, i.e., 1. These results for
the network scenario are compatible with the ones obtained for
the single-connection scenario in [4]. Fig. 9b shows the false
positive and false negative rates for OCSVM and DBSCAN.
Each point corresponds to a particular configuration of the
algorithm, while the line represents the Pareto frontier, i.e.,
the lowest false positive rate obtained for a particular false
negative rate. Points outside the line are regarded as dominated
points, i.e., they do not represent a good trade-off between
the false positive and false negative rates. For OCSVM, many
points are not a part of the Pareto frontier, while for DBSCAN
most of the points fall on the highlighted curve. This is
expected since the DBSCAN parameters clearly offer a trade-
off between false positive and false negative rates. On the other
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Fig. 9. Test results for the ML techniques tested. SL (a) is evaluated using the confusion matrix over the attack scenarios described in Sec. VI. SSL and UL
(b) are evaluated by the obtained false positive and negative rates. Insets show the best configuration parameters for OCSVM and DBSCAN.
hand, OCSVM configurations result with more scattered points
due to the different characteristics of the kernel functions.
The OCSVM approach shows good accuracy, where the best
configuration, i.e., the one with the highest f1 score of 0.963,
achieves 1.7% false positives and 5.3% false negatives. On
the other hand, DBSCAN has much lower accuracy, with the
best trade-off between false positives and false negatives (i.e.,
the highest f1 score of 0.8) observed when MinPts is set
to 5, which results in a 26.9% false positive and a 13.9%
false negative rate. Fig. 9b also shows a second point for
DBSCAN where MinPts is increased to 10, which prevents
the algorithm from forming clusters with a fewer number of
samples. This configuration reduces the false negatives (from
13.9% to 7.3%) at the expense of increasing the false positives
(from 26.9% to 45.9%) but might represent a good trade-off
in terms of security if network operators want to reduce the
risk of attacks remaining undetected.
Considering the false positive and false negative rates
achieved by each ML model, we focus on evaluating the
benefits and drawbacks of the WAD proposed in Sec. III-A.
In particular, we investigate the impact of the δ, γ and τ
parameter values on the performance gains obtained by the
WAD. As the ANN does not generate any false positives nor
false negatives, we focus on overcoming the inaccuracies of
SSL and UL.
Fig. 10 shows the benefits obtained by the WAD approach
when applied to the false positive and false negative rates
from the best OCSVM configuration, for varying δ and γ,
with τ = γ/2. As shown in Fig. 10a, the 5.3% false negative
rate initially obtained by OCSVM is completely compensated
for in most of the δ and γ configurations. By using higher
values of γ, WAD averts degradation of the initially low false
positive rate (i.e., 1.7%) obtained by OCSVM, as shown in
Fig. 10b.
Fig. 11 shows the benefits of applying WAD to the best-
performing configuration of DBSCAN (FP = 26.9% and
FN = 13.98%). The 13.98% false negative rate obtained by
sample-based DBSCAN is compensated in all cases, with very
small variations between configurations, as shown in Fig. 11a.
(a) Increase in true detection (b) Decrease in false detection
Fig. 10. Benefits obtained by the Window-based Attack Detection (WAD)
for different values of δ and γ, with τ=γ/2, considering the best OCSVM
configuration.
(a) Increase in true detection (b) Decrease in false detection
Fig. 11. Benefits obtained by the WAD for different values of δ and γ, with
τ=γ/2, considering the best DBSCAN configuration.
Moreover, as depicted in Fig. 11b, the 26.9% false positive
rate can be transformed into zero falsely detected alarms by
setting a low δ and a high γ. Therefore, the best configuration
for the WAD in this scenario would be δ=20 and γ=16.
Fig. 12 shows the benefits obtained by the WAD approach
when considering a more extreme case in which the DBSCAN
algorithm is set to trade a low false negative rate (i.e., 7.3%)
for a high false positive rate (i.e., 45.9%). This scenario is
applicable when operators prefer to sacrifice false positive rate
in favor of reducing the risk of attacks passing undetected.
With similar configuration as in the previous case, WAD is able
to maintain the good true positive properties of this DBSCAN
11
(a) Increase in true detection (b) Decrease in false detection
Fig. 12. Benefits obtained by the WAD for different configurations, with
τ=γ/2, considering the DBSCAN with MinPts=10 and =1.0.
configuration while drastically reducing the false positives.
These results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
window-based approach, and enable SSL and UL models to be
reliably used during the optical network operation. Moreover,
with a proper configuration of the WAD parameters, more
reliable information is fed to the ALM for breach localization,
improving the overall accuracy or security diagnostics.
Fig. 13 shows the probability of WAD raising an alarm
over the number of samples collected from the start of an
attack (γ). Assuming a monitoring cycle of 1 minute, the γ
value can be translated into the number of minutes elapsed
since the attack started, associated with the probability of
raising an alarm. The values shown in the figure are obtained
assuming the false positive and negative rates achieved by
OCSVM. For γ ≤ 0 no attack is present in the network,
and the shown value refers to the false detection probability.
The figure indicates that requiring fewer samples classified as
attack (e.g., τ=1) increases the chances of detecting the attack
in very early stages (i.e., the probability of detecting the attack
with just the first sample exceeds 90%), but at the expense of
a high false detection probability (from 16% when δ=10 up
to 52% when δ=40). On the other hand, stipulating a large
number of needed positive samples (e.g., τ=9) may impose
an undesirable delay in detecting the attack. Balancing the τ
values can achieve an adequate trade-off between the false
detection probability and the time to raise an alarm upon an
attack.
The two most promising configurations are τ=3 and τ=5,
and their usage should be decided by the network operator
depending on the overhead caused by false detection. If the
overhead caused by false positives is not too high, τ=3 pro-
vides quicker detection at a very low false detection rate. For
example, when τ=3 (δ=10), the attack detection probability
upon receiving three attack samples equals 86%, and increases
to 99% and 99.9% for the fourth and fifth attack sample,
respectively. This is accompanied with a false detection prob-
ability of 0.063%. On the other hand, if the overhead caused
by a false alarm is unacceptably high, the network operator
might want to prevent false detection at the expense of a
slightly longer time to detect attacks. This trade-off is obtained
by setting τ=5, yielding zero false detection probability, and
78%, 97% and 99% of detection probability upon receiving the
fifth, sixth an seventh attack sample, respectively. The figure
also shows that the size of the observation window δ does not
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Fig. 13. Probability of raising an alarm over time samples γ for different
values of attack detection window δ (shown in different line styles) and attack
samples threshold τ (shown in different colors).
affect the performance of the algorithm substantially, except
for very low or very high values of τ (e.g., τ=1 or τ=9).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed an ML-based framework for cognitive
and autonomous security diagnostics of physical-layer secu-
rity in optical networks. The framework comprises modules
for detection and identification of attacks that can leverage
on supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised learning to
detect attacks and, when applicable, identify their type and
intensity; as well as a module for connection- and/or link-
wise localization of attacks, incorporated into the NMS. We
propose a method for enhancing the performance of the ML
approaches with a window-based approach, which was shown
to compensate for the effect of false positives and false
negatives.
The paper provided insights into practical implementation
and integration aspects of the proposed framework and eval-
uated its performance for experimental data from an optical
network testbed subjected to different attacks, demonstrating
strong potential to perform autonomous, cognitive security
diagnostics. Future works and open questions include a deeper
investigation of the robustness of the monitoring platform to
variations in the “normal” failure conditions (i.e. capability of
correctly distinguish between attacks and failures).
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